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Control of emerging animal diseases critically depends on their early detection. However, 
designing surveillance programs for exotic and emerging diseases is very challenging because of 
knowledge gaps on the probability of incursion and mechanisms of spread. 
Using the example of Bluetongue Virus, which is exotic to the UK, we develop a meta-
population  epidemic-economic  modelling  framework  that  considers  the  incursion,  detection, 
spread and control of a disease in a livestock production system composed of heterogeneous 
subpopulations. The model is then embedded in an information gap (info-gap) framework to 
assess the robustness of surveillance and vaccination policies to unacceptable outbreaks losses 
and applied to the case of Bluetongue in the UK. 
The results show that active reporting of suspect clinical signs by farmers is a very robust 
way to reduce unacceptable outcomes. Vaccination of animals in high risk regions led to robustly 
protective programs. If vaccines are not available, surveillance targeted to the high risk region is 
very robust even if the extent of the high risk region is not known and effectiveness of detection 
is very low. Surveillance programs focusing in all regions with the same intensity are in general 
not robust unless the dispersal of the vector connecting both regions is very high. 
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Animal disease outbreaks cause significant costs to societies, through loss of productivity 
and death in livestock industries (Rich and Winter-Nelson 2007). It has been recently reported 
that endemic animal diseases may reduce productivity by around 17% in UK and up to 50% in 
developing  countries  (Flint  &  Woolliams,  2008).  Still  more  concerning  are  zoonotic  animal 
diseases as they can spread to humans, affecting public health and leading to considerable losses. 
Climate change, circulation of people and animals, and increasing trade flows may facilitate the 
spread of exotic diseases and emergence of new diseases (Racloz et al 2007). These present new 
challenges to agencies managing and controlling animal diseases. One of the main difficulties of 
managing exotic and new infectious diseases arises from uncertainty on how, when and where 
diseases may emerge and how they may spread through an animal population. Specifically, there 
may  be  lack  of  knowledge  on  how  animals  are  infected;  how  are  they  affected;  and  on 
transmission of infectious agents. Animal health authorities must decide how to invest limited 
resources on systems firstly, to identify new or exotic infectious disease and secondly, to control 
them despite these uncertainties. 
  The  longer  it  takes  to  detect  a  disease  the  larger  is  its  potential  impact  on  societies. 
Therefore,  successful  management  of  animal  diseases  critically  depends  on  their  quick  and 
accurate detection (Souza Monteiro, Hoinville and Cook 2010). This activity is also known as 
disease  surveillance,  which  can  be  defined  as  the  systematic  collection,  analysis  and 
interpretation of data on diseases occurring in a population, enabling the elaboration of measures 
to control their impact (Anonymous 2004). Of particular interest is scanning surveillance, which 
is  defined  as  the  monitoring  of  animal  populations  of  concern  to  detect  the  undefined  and 
unexpected (Lysons et al 2007).  
A  number  of  studies  have  focused  on  the  economics  of  infectious  animal  diseases 
(Bicknell, et al., 1999, Chi, et al., 2002, Gramig and Wolf 2007, Hennessy 2007, Horan and 
Fenichel  2007).  These  studies  focus  mainly  on  prevention,  control  and  the  incentives  for 
adoption of preventive disease management practices. Another recent study demonstrated the 
value of having flexibility over different options to manage crisis events, such as a Foot and 
Mouth Disease outbreak (Lan Ge 2008). Little attention has been given to the economics of 
disease surveillance. Kompas et al. (2006) estimated the optimal level of surveillance for Foot 
and Mouth disease in the USA using stochastic optimal control theory. A related literature is the  
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one  on  detection  of  new  pests  in  vegetable  production  and  management  of  invasive  species 
(Moffitt, Stranlund, and Osteen (in press)). While surveillance of endemic animal diseases is 
well established, there is great interest in designing effective and efficient surveillance for exotic 
and emerging diseases. In the case of these diseases there is often a significant dearth of data and 
information, which increases uncertainty of detection and prevention of disease outbreaks. In 
such circumstances, and specially when there is important knowledge limitations on infection 
and spread rates, we face severe uncertainty and in this case we may be better off designing 
robust surveillance strategies. These strategies inform decisions when we face information gaps 
and need to achieve a certain threshold performance criteria. 
In this paper we aim to identify a robust surveillance program for the case of Bluetongue 
virus, an exotic disease to the UK. Given a spatially structured population divided into a number 
of subpopulations with heterogeneous transmission rates and incursion risk of an exotic disease, 
our goal is to analyse a system that can guarantee a level of detection that prevents losses beyond 
a  given  threshold  of  acceptable  impact  of  disease  epidemics.  We  further  explore  how  the 
availability of vaccines for the disease impacts decisions on the design of robust surveillance 
programs. 
We deal with the problem by developing a modelling strategy that comprises two stages. 
First we develop an epidemic-economic model considering the emergence, spread and detection 
of an emergent disease in two coupled subpopulations. Spread is modelled as a meta-population 
risk-structured dynamic epidemic compartmental model (Anderson and May, 1992, Kermack 
and McKendrick, 1927, Rowthorn, et al., 2009). The epidemic model is linked to an economic 
module that aggregates and discounts the costs subject to the disease and its control. Second, the 
model is embedded in an information-gap (info-gap) (Ben-Haim, 2006) framework to assess the 
robustness of different surveillance-vaccination strategies. We illustrate our approach with the 
case of bluetongue virus (BTV) incursion and spread in England and Wales.  
 
Bluetongue disease in the UK 
 
Bluetongue is a vector-borne disease of high economic importance caused by the bluetongue 
virus (BTV) which is capable of infecting a wide range of ruminant species. BTV is spread by a 
vector, a biting midge (Culicoides) from local hosts (Wilson and Mellor, 2008). Among domestic  
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animals, sheep present a high mortality and morbidity although noticeable symptoms and death 
have  also  been  documented  in  cattle,  especially  for  the  case  of  BTV  serotype  8  in  Europe 
(Elbers, et al., 2008). 
While bluetongue is endemic in the North of Africa, it is still considered exotic in the 
North of Europe and the UK. In the Summer/Fall 2006 an outbreak of this disease started in 
Belgium,  Luxemburg,  Netherlands,  Western  Germany  and  North  Eastern  parts  of  France 
affecting  approximately  2000  holdings  by  mid  January  2007  and  causing  considerable 
production  losses  and  raising  mortality  rates  (Department  for  Environment,  Food  and  Rural 
Affairs [DEFRA] 2009). In August 2007, the first BTV infected farm in the UK was identified 
near Ipswich and  two more farms in Cambridgeshire, three in Kent and one in Sussex were 
subsequently  infected  (DEFRA  2008)..  These  infections  were  considered  the  result  of  new 
independent  introductions  from  the  continent  (Szmaragd,  et  al.,  2009).  These  outbreaks  in 
Northern  Europe  represented  an  500  miles  north  shift  of  BTV  occurrence  and  have  been 
associated with climate change. Climate change allows for better overwintering of the virus and 
an expansion in the range of Culicoides imicola, the main BTV vector (Purse, et al., 2005). Since 
this  first  outbreak  farmers  throughout  the  UK  have  been  encouraged  to  adopt  preventive 
measures,  namely  through  vaccination,  although  the  vaccination  uptake  rates  by  farmers  in 
different regions has been variable (Szmaragd, et al., 2009). 
The European Commission has established provisions for the control and eradication of 
bluetongue in Europe (European Commission, 2000).  Upon detection of a confirmed bluetongue 
case, a protection zone of 62 miles radius and a surveillance zone of 31 miles radius around the 
infected farm are imposed. Animal movement is restricted and insecticide applications and carcase 
incineration  are  carried  out  in  a  radius  of  15.5  miles  from  the  infected  farm  (European 
Commission,  2000).  These  rules  were  later  implemented  by  the  Commission  Regulation 
EC/1266/2007  (European  Commission,  2007)  by  which  BTV  monitoring  and  surveillance 
programs  were  specified.  Monitoring  programs  are  composed  of  serological  surveys  with 
sentinel animals tested at least once a month and an entomological survey with at least one ultra-
violet  aspiration  trap  in  geographical  units  of  772.2  miles
2  (European  Commission,  2007). 
Surveillance programs should be implemented at national level focusing on sampling high risk 
populations (European Commission, 2007). 
High  risk  areas  for  the  occurrence  of  BTV  outbreaks  can  be  identified  according  to  
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pathways of entry of infected vectors, temperature, animal movements and the occurrence of 
previous outbreaks - which might lead to new outbreaks after BTV overwintering if eradication 
was not totally achieved. Based on this information, sentinel early warning systems targeting 
high  risk  areas  have  been  suggested  as  an  efficient  way  to  allocate  surveillance  efforts  in 
Switzerland (Racloz, et al., 2008), however new introductions beyond the risk areas can also 
occur. Currently, there is a need to evaluate the effectiveness of surveillance programs for BTV 
in Europe and to identify the characteristics that would make them robustly protective. 
  
A meta-population epidemic-economic model of disease spread and detection 
A  dynamic  discrete-time  meta-population  epidemic-economic  model  considering  the  entry, 
spread,  detection  and  control  of  an  unknown  emergent  disease  that  affects  ruminants  was 
developed in the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2005). For the application of the 
model to BTV in the UK, the time period considered was 20 years and within each year we only 
modelled the period from the end of the Spring to mid Autumn because  in  colder  months  the 
vector  is  not  active  and  thus  there  is  no  transmission  of  BTV.  Policy-makers  must  formulate  a 
strategy to detect new BTV outbreaks, whether through new incursion of virus or through persistence 
within  the  affected  sub-population  and  to  control  the  epidemic  potential.    The  objective  is  to 
guarantee that the costs derived from the vector-borne disease, its surveillance and control are 
robustly below an unacceptable threshold. For simplicity, for the case of BTV in England and 
Wales we consider two distinct regions or subpopulations. More regions or subpopulations could 
be considered to increase the spatial resolution of the analysis without requiring model structural 
changes. For our model, we assume that the surveillance strategy recommended by the European 
Commission (2007) will be followed. We define a “high risk region” as a radius of 62 miles 
around the observed outbreaks in 2007 (protection zone); and a “low risk region” comprising the 
rest of England and Wales. Detection and vaccination efforts are allocated among the low risk 
region  (proportion  of  farms  with  sentinel  animals  that  are  inspected:  χ
j=0;  proportion  of 
vaccinated  animals:  θ
j=0
vac)  and  the  high  risk  region  (χ
j=1;  θ
j=1
vac),  where  the  superscript  j 
indicates the region and j = 0 (1) indicate the high (low risk) regions respectively. The allocation 
of  detection  and  vaccination  resources  is  complex  because  there  is  severe  uncertainty  the 
probability of BTV emergence in each region and on the rate of transmission of the disease 
within and between regions. This severe uncertainty is due to the multiple factors that jointly  
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play in the emergence of BTV, such as weather conditions, existence of reservoir and presence 
of infected vectors. 
 
 
Emergence of the disease 
The initial infection in the population occurs because of the introduction of infected hosts or 
vectors exogenous to the system and is modelled with a Poisson stochastic process. The Poisson 
process implies that there is a constant probability per unit of modelled time of a first animal 
becoming infected and every initial infection is independent of every other (Vose, 1997). The 
daily probability of a successful incursion: 
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=
        [1] 
Where: pincursion
j is the daily probability of an incursion into the system. Given our distinction 





Disease spread among a population of susceptible individuals can be well approximated using 
epidemic  compartmental  models  that  assume  homogeneous  individuals  and  perfect  mixing 
among  them  (Anderson  and  May,  1992,  Diekmann  and  Heesterbeek,  2000  ,  Kermack  and 
McKendrick, 1927). For the modelling of BTV it is necessary to consider the forces of infection 
between the host and the vector Culicoides spp., the fact that only some individuals become 
symptomatic and the existence of heterogeneous subpopulations. Our modelling strategy follows 
the epidemic model builds up from Gubbins, et al. (2008) and Szmaragd, et al. (2009). We 
employ a susceptible (S)-latent (L) (infected individuals that are not yet infectious) -infected 
(asymptomatic (A) and symptomatic (I))- and recovered (R) (SLAIR) compartmental epidemic 
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Where the first equation expresses how the number of susceptible individuals decreases because 
of contact with infected vectors within the same region j. The process of susceptible animals 
becoming  infected  is  governed  by  λ
j.  This  is  the  force  of  infection,  i.e.  the  rate  at  which 
susceptible animals become infected and λ
j = min(λ
j, 1). The infection of susceptibles by contact 
with infected vectors between regions is represented by λ
≠j. The second equation describes how 
those  hosts  newly  infected  become  latent  (first  element  of  the  equation)  and  how,  after  an 
incubation  period,  they  become  infected  symptomatic  or  asymptomatic  (second  and  third 
elements).  The  third  and  fourth  equations  represent  how  the  number  of  infected  animals 
increases by latent animals becoming infected and how they decrease due to their recovery, death 
and quarantine if detected. The fifth equation accounts for those animals that recovered naturally 
and infected animals that are detected, since it is assumed that quarantine measures would be 
imposed that prevent them from infecting other animals, thus epidemiologically behaving as 
recovered. The sixth equation accounts for the individuals that die due to the disease. 
The parameters of the model are: the incubation period of the disease in the host (µ); the 
proportion of latent individuals becoming asymptomatic (θasym); the infectious period of infected 
symptomatic  (ε)  and  asymptomatic  (εA);  the  rate  of  fatal  casualties  due  to  the  disease  (η); 
probability  of  correctly  detecting  and  quarantining  exposed  (pdE),  asymptotic  (pdA)  and 
symptomatic (pdI) infected individuals; the average number of host k per farm (n
k
farm); and φ = 0 
when the epidemic has not been yet detected and φ = 1 when detected. The superscript k denotes 




The force of infection for the k host species has two forms depending on whether the infections 
occur within the region (λ
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where N
jk is the population size in region j of host k. Recall that I is the number of infected 
vectors; b is the probability of transmission from an infected midge to a host; a is the biting rate, 
the reciprocal of the time interval between blood meals (Gubbins, et al., 2008); N
vec_j is the total 
number of vectors in region j; γ is the probability of a vector dispersing to other regions; and ρmix 
is a factor accounting for mixing imperfections between individuals such that  ρmix = 1 indicates 
perfect mixing and ρmix = 0 would indicate a landscape where the distance between farms is 
beyond any range of movement of the vector. For the purpose of the model this is as if distance 
is infinite, making the transmission of the disease impossible. ξ
kj is the proportion of bites that 
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where σ is the biting preference of the vector for cattle (k = 0) instead of sheep. 
 
 The infection of susceptibles between regions is modelled as a stochastic process by which λ
≠j 
equals zero if a random drawn from a uniform distribution (0, 1) is greater than λ
≠j and λ
≠j retains 
its value if the random drawn is lower. 
 
As mentioned before the population dynamics of the vector are represented by a SEID model. 
The  main  difference  with  the  SLAIR  host  model  is  that  it  does  not  present  a  recovered 
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 where r is the rate of recruitment of the adult female midge; µ is the incubation period of the 
midge; and ω is the mortality of the midge. λvec
j and λvec
j≠ are the force of infection experienced 
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where β
 is the probability of infection of a vector when biting an infected host; and Ψ is the 
proportion of animals that are moved within regions. 
 
The differential equations of the host and vector epidemic models were discretised and evaluated 
using the Euler method with a time step of 0.1 days (extensive numerical simulations showed 
that lower time steps produced similar predictions). 
 
Detection 
Detection can occur by two means: (i) farmers report suspicion of clinical signs of bluetongue in 
their animals with a precision of preport. Reporting is modelled as a binomial stochastic process of 
probability  preport  and  population  is  considered  as  the  number  of  infected  symptomatic 
individuals in the region each day; (ii) detection by a grid of farms with sentinel cattle since 
these are preferred by the Culicoides vector. These sentinel animals are assumed to be inspected 
by Government veterinary officers (note: this is a hypothetical assumption and use of sentinel 
animals  is  not  currently  practised  in  England  or  Wales).  The  weighted  mean  probability  of 
detection in each time period by the grid of sentinel animals is: 
( )
0 j k j j j
farm dE t dI t dA t j
dt j










Conditional on the occurrence of the first infection, the event of discovery of the outbreak is 
modelled by comparing p
j
dt of each region daily with a random draw from a uniform distribution 
between zero and one. If the random draw is below p
j
dt the outbreak is considered detected and 
control measures start in the region where the  case was detected, i.e. the region becomes a 
protection zone. We model these measures as the restriction of animal movements outside the 
region  (Ψ  =  0);  introduction  of  a  mdetect  times  more  intensive  sentinel  monitoring  program 
(including  sheep)  such  that  mdetect  ·  χ
j  =  min(mdetect  ·  χ
j,  1);  infected  detected  animals  are 
quarantined; animals with symptoms are reported at a rate of preport and quarantined; and the 
farms in the region are sprayed with insecticides leading to an increase of vector mortality of 
mspray times. Once the outbreak is eradicated control measures return to the initial levels. 
 
Vaccination 
The  vaccine  reduces  the  number  of  susceptible  individuals.  The  new  number  of  susceptible 
individuals at time t after the vaccination campaign at time t-1 in region j is: 
1
j j j
t t vac S S      =  
Where δ is the effectiveness of the vaccine; and θ
j




The distribution of the net present value of the total economic costs (TC) is divided between 
costs before the incursion and detection of the disease and costs after the incursion and detection. 
The costs before are: expenditures on surveillance and vaccination programs. The costs after are: 
increased  surveillance,  the  economic  impacts  caused  by  the  disease  on  the  hosts  (infertility, 
abortions and reduced growth rate: cBTV-host), impacts due to movement restrictions (with unit 
cost per animal of crestric), costs due to animals deaths, insecticide treatment and lost value of 
their exports: 
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Where: T: time horizon considered; ρ: discount rate; cd: unit cost of inspection of one host; cvac: 
unit cost of a vaccine dose; crum: market price of a host; and Clm: daily gross values of the 
livestock export trade market loss. The regions where BTV is detected lose the value of their 
export markets until the outbreak is eradicated. 
Analysis of robustness of surveillance programs using info-gap theory 
 
Decision-makers in Government or industry may face severe uncertainty when making decisions 
regarding the design and implementation of exotic and emerging animal disease surveillance 
programs. We adopt an information-gap (info-gap) approach (Ben-Haim, 2006) to assess the 
robustness of the model to different surveillance levels. Info-gap theory was developed by Ben-
Haim (2006) to assist decision-making in situations where the information about some areas of 
the  system  modelled  is  highly  deficient.  As  an  advantage  to  other  probabilistic  methods  of 
uncertainty modelling, info-gap does not require underlying assumptions about the distributions 
of uncertainty of the parameters. Info-gap has been successfully applied to several fields such as 
conservation  ecology  (Nicholson  and  Possingham,  2007),  invasive  species  introductions  and 
control  (Carrasco,  et  al.,  2010,  Moffitt,  et  al.,  2008,  Yemshanov,  et  al.,  2010)  or  terrorism 
prevention (Moffitt, et al., 2005). Primary limitations of the info-gap framework are the need to 
determine  a  performance  requirement  and  the  absence  of  any  obvious  economic  efficiency 
criteria to help in that determination. 
 
Three main components are required for info-gap analysis: (a) a mathematical process model 
(described  in  the  previous  section),  (b)  a  performance  requirement  and  (c)  a  model  of 
uncertainty. We assume that the government agency wants to adopt a surveillance protocol that 
guarantees that the maximum total costs (TC) due to the epidemic are less than an unacceptable 
threshold (TCmax). We further distinguish three thresholds or aspiration levels according to their 
degree of exigency: low exigency where the government aims to guarantee that TC are below 
60% of the value of the cattle population (TCmax_low); medium exigency where TC are below 50% 
of such value (TCmax_medium); and high exigency where TC are below 40% (TCmax_high). These 
values are chosen as illustrative examples – other conditions, such as the prioritisation of finite 
resources amongst competing demands, would also be important in practice. The performance 
requirement is:  
 
11 
F0.999(TC)  TCmax.                    [9] 
Because the epidemic models are stochastic, a distribution of outcomes instead of a single value 
is obtained for each horizon of uncertainty. We selected the 99.9
th percentile of the distribution to 
be compared with the performance criteria. 
The model for uncertainty expresses what is unknown about the parameters in the process model. 
It is an unbounded family of nested sets of possible values. Each set corresponds to a degree of 
knowledge-deficiency according to the level of nesting (Ben-Haim, 2004). We consider that the 
parameters  pincursion,  ρmix  (that  affects  the  disease  transmission),  preport,  the  actual  lack  of 
knowledge of the extent of the high risk area θmis (modelled as mismatched allocation of vaccines 
and  detection  efforts  that  are  allocated  to  the  unintended  region),  γ  (dispersal  of  the  vector 
between regions), and pdA (assuming θasym = 1) present severe uncertainty. The corresponding 








 be) and UpdA
 j(α, pdA
 be). α is the information-gap between what is known and 
what needs to be known for an ideal solution and the superscript “be” indicates are our best 
estimates of the model parameters. 
 
The greater is α the greater the range of possible variation. The value of α is unknown and 
unbounded and expresses the idea that possibilities expand as the info-gap grows, imbuing α 
with its meaning of “horizon of uncertainty” (Ben-Haim, 2004). 
                         
We  evaluate  the  horizon  of  uncertainty  α  using  an  exponential  function  instead  of  a  linear 
function to emphasize the sampling of the parameter space for small values. The evaluation is 
done in such a way that the worst possible scenarios are studied, e.g. increasing pincursion, ρmix θmis 
from their original value to a value close to one (right hand side of equation [10]) and decreasing 
preport and pdA from their original value to a value close to zero (left hand side of equation [10]) 
following: 
( ) min ,1
c be be c be e d e
         
                 
     
 ;  [ ] 0,1                 [10] 
where c and d are scale constants. For an adequate sampling of the parameter space we set c = 2 
and d = 10. Info-gap theory identifies as the best policy the one that is most robustly satisficing 
(Ben-Haim, 2006), i.e. the goal is not to minimize the NPV of total costs but to maximise the  
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reliability of an acceptable outcome. The most robust policy will be the one that presents most 
immunity to unacceptable outcomes. We employ a robustness function     : 
 ( )
( )
( ) { } 0.999 max
,
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     is equal to the maximum value of α, in such a way that the 99.9
th percentile of the NPV of 
total costs fulfils the performance criterion given different surveillance levels and uncertainty in 








Robust surveillance under severe uncertainty on the spatial transmission of the disease 
The most robust policies when the effect of farms connectedness by movement of animals and 
vectors is severely uncertain were those involving vaccination of the high risk region (Figure 1 
A). A vaccination policy covering 40% of the population would be able to avoid increases in the 
99.9
th percentile of the discounted total costs even if the mixing among animals was perfect, i.e. 
all the cattle and sheep confined in the same location. In reality, for many emerging diseases no 
vaccines will be available and surveillance will be the only option. In this case, the least robust 
surveillance strategy would be to deploy detection efforts on the low risk region. Even a “do 
nothing” policy results more robust (Figure 1 A), indicating that in the case of bluetongue in 
England  and  Wales  it  is  more  cost-effective  not  to  search  at  all  than  mounting  a  detection 
campaign of the same high intensity in both the high and low risk regions. In contrast a strategy 
focusing on the surveillance of the high risk region was almost as robust as strategies involving 
vaccination, and total costs did not increase even under perfect mixing. 
 
Robust surveillance under severe uncertainty on the probability of incursion 
As  the  horizon  of  uncertainty  regarding  the  probability  of  incursion  increases,  making  the 
probability of incursion greater in the high risk region, the most robust policies are those that 
involve vaccinating the high risk region (Figure 1 B). Surprisingly, in the case of no vaccine 
availability, surveillance activities not only do not increase the robustness of the management 
policies  but  they  make  them  less  robust.  The  reason  is  that,  under  very  high  probability  of 
incursion, the epidemics cannot be mitigated by surveillance, i.e. even if surveillance activities 
allow for control of a few incursions, many others will not be detected in time and the epidemic 
will occur. The delay obtained by surveillance activities does not compensate their cost (see 
Figure 1B where strategies involving surveillance and no vaccination are less robust with regard 
to  the  medium  and  low  aspiration  level  than  implementing  no  action  in  the  “do  nothing” 
strategy). Thus, any knowledge that constrains the upper limit of the risk of incursion may be of 
great importance in deciding upon an optimum surveillance or vaccination strategy. 
 
Robust surveillance under severe uncertainty on the capacity of farmers to report the disease  
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In the case of some diseases, a proportion of infected animals can present clear clinical signs 
after a period of incubation of the disease. If the farmers are well informed and vigilant about the 
potential occurrence of these symptoms, their active reporting can be a low cost and extremely 
effective way to detect the early emergence of disease (Figure 1C). In contrast with Figure 1 A, 
B and D and Figure 2 where we assumed that farmers could not detect or report the disease, 
active  reporting  is  shown  to  be  able  to  reduce  the  99.9
th  percentile  of  total  cost  to  a  third 
(compare Figure 1 A and B with Figure C for α = 0, with a reduction from £B 1.5 to £B 0.5). All 
the  policies  appeared  very  robust  due  to  farmers  active  reporting.  The  strategies  involving 
surveillance of the low risk region (which is much larger in magnitude to the high risk region), 
were considerably less robust because outlays were applied to an activity that did not increase 
the effectiveness of detection or the initiation of control.. Interestingly, these results hold even 
for  very  low  probabilities  of  accurate  reporting  by  farmers,  showing  the  high  potential  of 
involving the farmers on the detection of emerging diseases. 
 
Robust surveillance under severe uncertainty on the detection effectiveness 
To be able to evaluate the effect of lower detection effectiveness clearly, we set the proportion of 
asymptomatic  animals  to  one,  which  led  to  a  drastic  downward  shift  of  the  expected  costs 
(Figure 2 B and C). The results demonstrated how, even if the effectiveness of detection is very 
low, a policy of surveillance in the high risk region is of comparable robustness to policies using 
vaccination (Figure 2 B). 
 
Robust surveillance under severe simultaneous uncertainty on incursion, transmission, vector 
dispersal and detection 
We  evaluated  an  info-gap  framework  where  all  the  uncertain  parameters  were  varied 
simultaneously.  The  results  showed  patterns  consistent  with  the  analysis  of  the  individual 
horizons of uncertainty for the policies of surveillance of both regions and the low risk region 
(that were less robust) and surveillance of the high risk region and vaccination (which were more 
robust). The main difference resided in the “do nothing” scenario that as expected was a robust 
alternative.  The  reason  is  that  diseases  that  present  a  high  probability  of  incursion  and 




Robust surveillance under severe uncertainty regarding the extension of the high risk region 
Uncertainty on the actual extension of the high risk region leads to unintended allocation of 
vaccines and surveillance in regions where the probability of entry is low. Strikingly, the results 
showed that a policy of only surveying the high risk region was robust to uncertainty in the 
knowledge of the extension of the high risk region for values of α between 0.2 and 0.5 (Figure 1 
D). The reason is that even if a large proportion of surveillance efforts are misallocated to the 
low risk region, the proportion correctly allocated to the high risk region still has an important 
protective impact and a small amount of surveillance in the low risk region is also beneficial. 
This is not the case of vaccine allocation because allocation of vaccine to the low risk region 
instead of the high risk area reduces the capacity of the vaccine to control the epidemic in the 
high risk region. As a result, a policy of surveillance of the high risk region unexpectedly appears 
more robust than a policy of vaccination (Figure 1 D). 
 
Robust surveillance under severe uncertainty on the probability of vector dispersal 
Vector dispersal might lead to spread of the disease between regions. Under severe uncertainty, a 
policy of surveillance in both regions (which is very costly) appeared very robust with respect to 
the medium aspiration threshold (Figure 2 A). Intuitively, for high levels of vector dispersal 
between regions the probability of interregional infection is high, making it advisable to conduct 
surveillance in both regions. This can be noted in Figure 2 A, where for values of α greater than 
0.8, the values of the 99.9
th percentile of discounted costs increases for all strategies except for 
surveillance  of  both  regions  which  decreased  the  discounted  costs.  This  result  is  somewhat 
surprising since, for the rest of horizons of uncertainty considered, a policy of surveillance in 





Here we developed an epidemic-economic model in a landscape with two interconnected 
regions with a heterogeneous risk of incursion and spread of an emerging disease. We employed 
info-gap theory to assess the robustness of surveillance strategies for animal disease control. 
Using the case study of bluetongue incursion in England and Wales, new insights for robust 
surveillance  strategies  were  obtained.  Knowledge  of  the  pathways  of  entry  of  a  disease,  the 
spatial distribution of climatic variables that increases the probability of disease incursion and 
the structure of the production system that promotes disease spread allows in many cases to 
differentiate between low and high risk regions. Accounting for the spatial heterogeneity of the 
risk of disease incursion and spread represents an opportunity to identify robustly protective and 
cost-effective surveillance strategies. 
The results predicted that, in a landscape divided by a small high risk region and a large 
low risk region, the most robustly protective policies involved vaccination of 40-50% of the 
animals in the high risk region. The model suggests that vaccination could contribute to limiting 
the size of an outbreak and reduce the risk of spread to the larger low risk region. In addition, 
consistent with epidemic theory, vaccination policies were able to avert large outbreaks even for 
high probability of incidence of new incursions and perfect mixing among individuals. However, 
it must be borne in mind that these results are predicated on our underlying assumptions, which 
include a considerable horizon of uncertainty in respect of the risk of incursion. If that risk were 
constrained then the vaccination strategy might be predicted to be less robust. Likewise, if our 
costs for surveillance were importantly over or under-estimated then different conclusions might 
result. This can be investigated further through sensitivity analysis. We chose relatively high 
threshold for exigency in the info-gap model – in reality, investment in surveillance for BTV 
would compete with limited resources for other surveillance priorities and a lower value might 
be imposed. However, where a surveillance strategy such as promoting the reporting of suspect 
clinical  signs  by  farmers  might  also  serve  to  detect  multiple  diseases,  then  the  value  of  the 
approach would increase.  
In the case of new diseases, vaccines are not likely to be available and surveillance for 
early  detection  is  one  of  the  main  mitigation  options.  The  results  showed  that  intensive 
surveillance of the high risk region was robustly protective but intensive surveillance on both  
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regions  was  not  a  robust  policy  and  that,  under  severe  uncertainty  regarding  probability  of 
incursion and transmission, it was even less robust than doing nothing (unless in the case of high 
interregional vector dispersal which is discussed below). Our results regarding the robustness of 
surveying high risk regions are in agreement with results in the related field of invasive alien 
species surveillance. Hauser and McCarthy (2009) showed that regions with a high probability of 
invasive species occurrence and great benefits associated with detection should have intensive 
surveillance. In our case, surveillance of the high risk region implies high avoided costs because 
of  prompt  detection  of  incursion  and  the  opportunity  for  rapid  control,  preventing  further 
transmission to the second much larger region. Interestingly, surveillance of the high risk region 
was a very robust strategy even under perfect mixing of individuals within regions. This result 
can be interpreted from a reverse angle: a surveillance strategy accurately targeted to the high 
risk areas can achieve the same results as a presumably much more costly preventive policy 
consisting of the restriction of the spatial movement of animals between farms to reduce disease 
transmission. 
The results regarding the robustness of the surveillance of the high risk region did not 
imply that the low risk region should not have any surveillance efforts. In the case of severe lack 
of  knowledge  of  the  extension  of  the  high  risk  region,  an  unintended  proportion  of  the 
surveillance efforts were allocated to the low risk region. This resulted in a robust policy that 
also prevented infrequent outbreaks in the low risk region that could potentially spread and if 
totally  undetected,  could  affect  a  large  proportion  of  the  population  in  the  low  risk  region. 
However, this is an unlikely scenario for BTV in England or Wales. This logic did not apply to 
vaccine allocation between regions. Vaccine misallocations into the low risk region due to the 
lack of knowledge of the extent of the high risk region led to a less robust policy than a strategy 
of surveillance in the high risk region. This result is consistent with the control of a disease in 
two interconnected regions for which the administration of treatment to equalize the infection 
level in both patches has been shown to be the worst possible strategy to minimise the overall 
level of infection. It is instead more beneficial to focus on the control of the area with the lowest 
infection level (Rowthorn, et al., 2009). Similarly, not focusing campaigns in the high risk area 
converted  vaccination  into  a  non  robust  strategy  because  it  led  to  two  reduced  campaigns 
incapable of preventing the epidemic from taking off in either of the regions (instead of just one 
campaign preventing the take off of the epidemic in the high risk region). This serves to illustrate  
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the value of knowledge that enables accurate identification of high risk areas. Where a seasonal 
effect is also present, as in the case of BTV, then high risk can be attributed to space and time. 
The characteristics of the connectivity between regions was shown to be very relevant for 
the  adequate  selection  of  surveillance  policies,  as  in  the  case  of  the  election  of  the  optimal 
harvesting strategy in patchy and infected wildlife populations (Horan, et al., 2005). In the case 
of bluetongue, vector dispersal between regions cannot be directly controlled whereas animal 
movements  between  regions  can  be  stopped.  The  info-gap  analysis  regarding  the  dispersal 
characteristics of the vector showed that, when interregional dispersal is very high, intensive 
surveillance of both regions was a robust strategy because infection of one region will most 
likely lead to the infection of the rest of the regions. However, experience in Northern Europe 
indicates that very high inter-regional transmission of BTV is unlikely in reality. If this was the 
case, the distinction between both risk regions becomes vague and the robustness of policies 
focusing on surveillance of the high risk region is dampened. 
Surveillance campaigns  focusing on the high risk region were shown to be robust to 
increasingly  worse  scenarios;  however,  they  could  not  obtain  a  substantial  decrease  in  the 
expected costs due to the disease. In contrast, farmers’ inspection and reporting was shown to be 
by far the most effective way for early detection and control of emerging diseases leading to a 
substantial reduction of expected costs. This was the case even if the capacity of the farmers to 
correctly identify and report the disease was very limited. Indeed, in practice new outbreaks of 
epidemic  disease  such  as  BTV,  Foot  &  Mouth  Disease,  Classical  swine  fever  and  Avian 
Influenza  have  frequently  been  discovered  through  the  observation  and  reporting  of  suspect 
clinical signs by vigilant livestock farmers. These results are consistent with examples of past 
successful  eradication  campaigns  where  public  involvement  in  outbreak  detection  thorough 
information  campaigns  has  been  shown  to  be  a  very  effective  way  to  prevent  harmful  non-
indigenous species from invading new environments. For instance reports by members of the 
public of small outbreaks of Colorado potato beetle in the UK has helped to maintain the UK 
Colorado beetle free status for over 100 years (Bartlett, 1980). In this sense, modelling efforts 
integrating farmers’ adoption of biosecurity measures (Gramig and Wolf, 2007, Hennessy, 2007, 
Hennessy, 2008) with epidemic theory and surveillance systems present a big potential to obtain 
further insights on the designing of robust surveillance strategies through public involvement.  
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Our modelling approach has some limitations. Epidemic compartmental models assume 
perfect mixing of individuals in the population. In the case of animal diseases, the hosts are 
confined in farms and the mixing is relatively limited to movement of animals between farms. 
Bluetongue, however, is a vector-borne disease and the vector can move freely between farms, 
although distances play a role in the mixing of the vectors. To account for spatial structure we 
applied a metapopulation approach with two subpopulations and incorporated a parameter in the 
force  of  infection  reflecting  difficulties  in  transmission  due  to  imperfect  mixing.  However, 
greater spatial resolution of the model could be obtained by considering each individual farm as 
a single subpopulation (e.g. Szmaragd, et al., 2009). At the risk of not capturing interesting 
spatial interactions (such as the relationship between the incubation period and the biting rate 
with temperature), we preferred to keep the spatial structure of the model simple to answer more 
general questions on robust surveillance and to provide for a modelling framework that could be 
easily modified and applied to other diseases without extensive data demands. 
Info-gap theory is a simple and intuitive way to formalise the analysis of robustness of 
mathematical models that shifts the objective of the agency from minimisation of costs to a 
satisfactory and protective behaviour. Info-gap is however not free of limitations, such as the 
difficulty  to  select  the  performance  criteria  and  the  election  of  the  origin  of  the  horizon  of 
uncertainty. Nonetheless, the use of parameters from literature provides for a good starting point 
for the analysis of robustness of the model. 
Conclusions and future research 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  on  the  economics  of  disease  surveillance. 
Specifically we focus on the case of surveillance system for exotic and emerging diseases, where 
there are important gaps on the information required to make appropriate decisions. If the aim of 
an agency is safeguard the possibility of disaster under severe uncertainty over detection and 
spread of an animal disease, then an important feature of the system is its robustness. In other 
words the system should be designed to prevent total losses to society beyond a given level of 
performance.  Specifically,  we  considered  the  economic  and  epidemiological  conditions  that 
make surveillance strategies between heterogeneous regions or patches robust. Our approach, 
combining epidemic-economic models with info-gap theory, is novel and generated decision-
making insights for robust surveillance of emerging animal diseases. We applied this model to 
data concerning Bluetongue disease in England and Wales, making assumptions about possible  
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strategies and costs for illustrative purposes. The paper is not intended to reflect official policy in 
UK. The main conclusion of this study is robustness is not greatly affect by lack of surveillance 
in low risk areas, but it critically depends on farmer involvement in surveillance.  
We believe our approach is an alternative to the recently proposed risk based surveillance 
systems (Stärk, et al., 2006). Moreover our modelling framework can be particularly useful and 
relevant for decision makers charged with the duty of developing a surveillance system that 
detects new diseases and or known diseases in new environments. 
In this paper we only considered two types of regions, a low and a high risk area, and we 
did not fully considered the interactions between vector and animal movements. In the future we 
aim to look in more detail at the spatial and time dimension of this problem. We think that it may 
be useful to adapt a network approach where each farm is a node linked with each other and 
there are flows of animals and vectors. This should gives an even more detailed and practical 
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Table  1.  Epidemic  and  entomological  parameters  of  the  model  for  the  surveillance  of  BTV 
outbreaks in the UK. Values expressed as ranges were modelled as uniform distributions. 
Param
eter 
Parameter description  Cattle  sheep  Source 
       
 
N  Total number of susceptible individuals in 






µ  Incubation period (days)  0-7  0-21 
a 
ε, εA  Infectious period for infected symptomatic 
and asymptomatic (days)  20.6  16.4 
d 
η
  Mortality of the host due to the disease  0.003;   0.3 
j 
Θasym 
Proportion infected becoming 
asymptomatic  0.96  0.4 
j 
b  Probability of transmission from vector to 
host  0.8-1.0 
e 
β  Probability of transmission from host to 
vector  0.001-0.15 
g 
σ  Biting preference for cattle with respect to 
sheep  9 
h 
ω  Mortality of the vector  0.1-0.5 
i 
  Ratio of vectors to host  0-5000 
e 
r  Vector recruitment rate  0.1-0.5 
f 
a  Biting rate  0-0.5 
e 
γ   Proportion of vectors dispersing beyond 
the protected zone  10
-6  l 
Ψ  Proportion of animals moved daily 








µvec  Incubation period of the vector (days)  4-26 
c 
a Estimated from (Bonneau, et al., 2002);
 b (DEFRA, 2009, Welsh Assembly Government, 2009); 
c (Gerry and Mullens, 2000); 
d (Goldsmit, et al., 1975); 
e (Gubbins, et al., 2008); 
g (Nunamaker, 
et al., 1997); 
h assumed from studies showing that there is a preference of the vector to bite cattle 
(Nevill,  1978); 
i  (Birley  and  Boorman,  1982); 
j  (DEFRA,  2007); 
f  assumed  similar  to  the 
mortality rate (Savini, et al., 2005); 
k we use as a surrogate the number of animals moved out of 
the current surveillance zone to live destinations if restrictions stop in England (DEFRA, 2007). 
The  animal  movements  have  been  estimated  as  63000  cattle  and  113000  sheep  per  year. 
Movements to slaughter are assumed not to affect epidemic dynamics. The probability is the 
proportion of moved animals with respect the total population outside the surveillance zone; 
l 
Wind contributed to explain the BTV epidemic in northern Europe in 2007 with establishment of 
local virus circulation at distances of 35–85 km (Hendrickx, et al., 2008). These hops indicate a 
leptokurtic  spread  where  a  few  individuals  can  disperse  long  distances.  We  assume  that  a 
proportion of 10





Table 2. General parameters of the model for the surveillance of BTV outbreaks in the UK. 
Paramet
er 
Parameter description  value  Sour
ce 
     
pincursion 
Daily  probability  of  first  infection  into  the 
system per region  (
0low risk region;







T  Time horizon (years)  20   
ρ  Discount factor  0.035 
b 
BexC 
Average  value  of  cattle  meat  exports  from  the 
UK (2006 and 2007) ($ millions) 
90.631 
c 
BexS  Average value of sheep meat exports from the 












cBTV-host  Loss of value of infected symptomatic animals 
due to loss of fertility, abortions and or reduced 






cd  Unit cost of inspection of one animal (£)  3.33 
j 





















δ  Effectiveness of the vaccine  0.95   
nfarm  Mean number of animals per farm  30   
pdI  Probability of correctly detecting infected 
symptomatic 
1   
pdA  Probability of correctly detecting infected 
asymptomatic 
0.8   
pdE  Probability of correctly detecting exposed  0.6   




mspray  Increase in vector mortality due to spraying  3 
i 
mdetect  Factor of increase of the proportion of 
surveillance after detection 
10   
preport  Probability of accurately reporting BTV 
symptoms by the farmer 
0.9   
TCmax_lo
w 





Medium exigency aspiration level (£ millions)  89.673   
TCmax_hi
gh 
High exigency aspiration level (£ millions)  17.934   
a  In  the  case  of  the  high  risk  region,  we  assume  that  the  outbreaks  of  BTV  in  Ipswich, 
Cambridge, Kent and Sussex in 2007 responded to independent entries and represented the risk 
under  current  climate  for  the  last  ten  years;  in  the  low  risk  region  we  assume  that  one 
independent entry is expected to occur in next 20 years; 
b (Treasury, 1997); 
c (FAO, 2010); 
d The 
area of a protected zone of 100 km radius is expressed as a proportion of the area of Wales and 
England, assuming that given that a sample of the size of the high risk region is very large, the 
distribution  of  holdings  can  be  approximated  as  homogeneous; 
e  5%  of  the  animal  value 
(DEFRA, 2007); 
f Calculated as (BexC + BexS) pexHR (365)
-1; 
g two 1ml doses are needed per cattle 
and 1ml dose per sheep at a cost of £ 0.66 per ml (DEFRA, 2010); 
h We assume a cost of 
insecticide of £3 and a cost of application of £14 per 30 animals holding. Applications are done 
once a week; 
i insecticides will have high effectiveness in the holdings applied but not on the rest 
of  vectors  in  the  environment  that  will  easily  replace  the  controlled  population  making  this 
parameter highly uncertain; 
j The mean travelling costs (3 visits per farm), the wage costs of 
DEFRA personnel is assumed to be £30 per a 30 animals farm. The laboratory costs for the 
serological analysis is assumed £70 per sample analysed that allow to detect the disease in a farm 






Figure 1. Evaluation of the robustness of vaccination and surveillance policies under severe 
uncertainty  in:  A)  transmission  of  the  diseases  within  each  region  (ρmix);  B)  probability  of 
incursion of the disease in the high risk region (pincursion); C) rate of reporting of the farmers 
(preport); and D) lack of knowledge of the extension of the high risk region (θmis). HRR: high risk 
region; LRR: low risk region; TC net present value of the total costs expressed in billions of £. 
The probability of reporting by the farmers was set to zero except in plot C. The proportion of 
farms survey was set as 0.003 and the proportion of animals vaccinated was set at 0.4 in the 







Figure 2. Evaluation of the robustness of vaccination and surveillance policies under severe 
uncertainty in: A) vector dispersal within regions (γ); B) effectiveness of detection measures 
(pdA); C) simultaneous severe uncertainty in the parameters pincursion, ρmix , preport, θmis, γ, and pdA. 
D) The levels of vaccination and surveillance were varied to assess changes in robustness. The 
proportion of asymptomatic individuals was set to zero in plots B) and D) to assess the effect of 
increasingly less effective detection measures (represented by pdA). HRR: high risk region; LRR: 
low risk region; TC net present value of the total costs expressed in billions of £. The probability 
of farmers reporting was set to zero. 
 
 
 